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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.

On November 16, 1995 the trial court signed the contempt

order against Appellant.
2.

(R. 728).

Respective counsel for both parties agreed that this

order required Appellant to pay all reasonable

and

necessarily

incurred attorney fees and costs that Appellee had incurred in
connection with the show cause hearings to date.

(See Exhibit

One of Appellee's Brief).
3.

The Appellant filed an objection, pro se, on November

16, 1995, to the order concerning attorney fees and other issues.
(R. 730).
4.

The trial court determined that this objection was

timely filed and vacated the November 16 order to consider the
objection.
5.

(R. 734).

The court then ordered that respective counsel for both

sides meet to generate an amended proposed order reflecting any
agreed upon changes which would be submitted to the court on or
before December 8, 1995.
6.

(R. 734).

In addition, the court ordered that if any objections

remain unresolved, then an amended objection shall likewise be
filed by plaintiff on or before December 8, 1995.
7.

(R. 734).

Respective counsel failed to meet, however they did have

a discussion over the phone concerning the time period for which
1

the reasonable fees would be assessed.

(See Exhibit One of

Appellee's Brief).
8.

Appellee's counsel, Mr. Mangrum, then drafted a vague

letter concerning this phone call without mentioning the
reasonableness of the fees anywhere in the letter, only the time
period for which the fees would be assessed.
9.

(Id.).

On December 8, 1995, pursuant to the court's order

concerning any remaining objections, Appellant filed an
objection, pro se, to the reasonableness of the attorney fees
sought as claimed in Mr. Mangrum's affidavit.
10.

(R. 738-757).

The court determined that Appellant was precluded from

contesting the reasonableness of attorney fees as stated in Mr.
Mangrum's affidavit because of the vague letter signed by both
counsel concerning the dates to be considered and because
Appellant did not obtain leave from the court to appear pro se on
December 8, 1995.
11.

(Tr. 972).

For these reasons, the court refused to conduct an

evidentiary hearing on the issue of the reasonableness of
attorney fees.
12.

(R. 820; Tr. 960).

The final order was entered on January 6, 1997, and

Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal on January 17, 1997.
847-49).

2

(R.

ARGUMENT
I.

Timely Objections Were Made by the Appellant and
Therefore the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Not
Holding an Evidentiary Hearing on the Reasonableness of
Attorney Fees.
A.

Appellant's Pro Se Objections Were Valid and
Timely.

Appellant's objection made on November 16, 1995 and her
amended objection made on December 8, 1995 were valid and timely.
The Utah Constitution states that uno person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself

or counsel,

any civil cause to which he is a party."

Utah Const, art. If §11 (emphasis added).

Appellant had counsel,

Mr. Ward, on both of these dates, however, Mr. Ward was
unavailable to file timely objections on these dates.
22).

(R. 821-

Therefore, the trial court erred by dismissing her amended

objection on the grounds that she had not received leave from the
court to file pro se because in so doing, the trial court was
denying Appellant's right to prosecute or defend a civil cause to
which she was a party as stated in the Utah Constitution.

In

addition, Appellant's pro se objection made on November 16 was
accepted by the court as valid and timely without any mention
from the court about leave being required to file pro se.
734) .

3

(R.

Appellant's pro se objections were both made timely.

The

objection on November 16 was accepted by the court as timely, and
the court subsequently vacated the November 16 order to consider
the objection.

(R. 734). The order pertained to the contempt

charge and the payment by Appellant of reasonable attorney fees
to Appellee.

(R. 847). The objection was not artfully crafted,

however, it did present objections to the attorney fees.
730).

(R.

The Supreme Court has held that pro se civil complaints

are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers."
(per curiam).

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)

Further, the Court stated that if the pro

se

allegations are sufficient, "however inartfully pleaded, . . .
[then they] call for the opportunity to offer supporting
evidence."

Id.

The trial court allowed that amended objections could be
filed on or before December 8, 1995.

(R. 734). Appellant filed

her amended objection on December 8.

(R. 738-57).

After

reviewing Appellant's objection and amended objection, however
unartfully pleaded, it is apparent that Appellant has
sufficiently alleged that the attorney fees requested are
unreasonable.

Therefore, an opportunity to offer supporting

evidence is required.

4

B.

The Letter Dated December 6, 1995 Did Not Contemplate
the Reasonableness of the Attorney Fees and Therefore
There Was No Stipulation as to the Reasonableness
Issue.

Pursuant to the court's order, counsel for both parties
discussed the time frame for which reasonable attorney fees would
be assessed.

Counsel discussed this over the phone, and

Appellee's counsel drafted a letter, dated December 6, 1995, (the
"Letter") concerning this discussion.

(R. 821-23).

First, the

Letter reiterated the court order that Appellant be required to
pay all reasonable

and necessarily

incurred

attorney fees and

costs that Appellee had incurred in connection with the show
cause hearings to date.

(R. 821-23).

Second, the Letter

described how each counsel interpreted this order in relation to
the multiple contempt motions filed by Appellee and the time
frame for which the court required reasonable attorney fees to be
assessed.

(R. 821-23).

Nowhere in the Letter did either party stipulate to what
would constitute reasonable attorney fees.

(R. 821-23).

The

parties were merely discussing the relevant time frames.

(R.

821-23).

This is apparent from a number of facts.

First, Appellant's original objection, timely filed on
November 16, 1995, to the reasonableness of attorney fees was not
waived anywhere in the language of the Letter.

(R. 821-23).

order for a waiver to be found "it must be made to appear that
5

In

[Appellant] waived the right either in express terms or by
showing such facts and circumstances from which the intention to
waive may be clearly inferred or implied."
P. 908, 912 (Utah 1920).

Woolley v. Loose, 194

There was no express waiver in the

Letter (R. 821-23), nor do the facts and circumstances show an
intention to waive Appellant's objection.
Second,

(See below).

Appellant did not intend to waive her objection to

the reasonableness of the fees requested as evidenced by her
second pro se objection on December 8, 1995, (R. 738-757), and
therefore, the trial court erred by considering the Letter to be
a waiver.
right."

"A waiver is the intentional

relinquishment of a known

Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 61 P.2d 308, 311 (Utah

1936)(emphasis added).

The Minute Entry on November 17, 1995,

which ordered both counsel to meet, also required that if any
objections remained unresolved, then an amended objection had to
be filed on or before December 8, 1995.

(R. 734.).

Appellant's

amended objection was timely filed and enumerated her objections
to the reasonableness of the requested fees.

(R. 734). Since

the Letter does not contain an express waiver of her objection to
the reasonableness of the fees requested, and the facts do not
reveal any implied waiver or intention to waive, the trial court
erred in finding that Appellant waived her objection.
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In addition, it is evident from Mr. Mangrum's subsequent
filings that he also believed that the reasonableness of the fees
requested was an unresolved issue after the Letter.

Mr. Mangrum,

in responding to a motion by Appellant, argued that "the only
unresolved issue [sic] is the reasonableness of fees incurred."
(R. 793). In addition, in an affidavit filed July 10, 1996, Mr.
Mangrum asserted that "the only unresolved issue is the
reasonabl eness of the fees for the time expended."

(R. 795—804

and 114 at 797) .
Finally, the Letter refers to the court order requiring
Appellant to pay reasonable

attorney

fees,

and then goes on to

state the interpretations of counsel concerning the time frames
for these fees.

(R. 821-23).

The Letter does not discuss the

reasonableness of the fees requested or that this issue was even
brought up during counsels' telephone conference.

(R. 821-23).

According to Mr. Ward's affidavit, the telephone conference
discussion was limited to the amount of $2,200 which was
proffered by Mr. Mangrum at the time of trial.

(See Exhibit One

of Appellee's Brief).
Therefore, without express language to the contrary in the
Letter, the trial court interpreted the Letter to be a waiver of
Appellant's objection to the reasonableness of the attorney fees,
and a decision by both counsel to ignore the court' s order that
7

Appellant only had to pay the reasonable

attorney fees.

The record shows that the Letter was not a stipulation by
Appellant waiving her objection to the reasonableness of the
attorney fees requested by Appellee.
C.

Because the Parties Did Not Agree Otherwise, the Trial
Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Taking Evidence of
the Reasonableness of the Attorney Fees.

As evidenced from the arguments above, the parties did not
stipulate to the reasonableness of the attorney fees, and
therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
consider the evidence concerning the reasonableness of the fees
awarded.

"The Utah Supreme Court stated that unless the parties

agree otherwise, a trial court must take evidence of the
reasonableness of attorney fees and make findings thereon."
Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 679 (Utah App.
1994)(emphasis added) (citing Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 497
P.2d 629, 630 (Utah 1972).

Therefore, the trial court abused its

discretion by not considering evidence on the reasonableness of
attorney fees.
II.

Appellee Attorney's Affidavit Concerning Attorney
Fees Was Insufficient Under Utah Law.

The mere listing of general activities and an hourly rate
accompanied by a simple statement that the fees are reasonable in
an affidavit is insufficient proof for an award of reasonable
attorney fees.

Rule 4-505 of the Code of Judicial Administration
8

requires affidavits in support of attorney fees:
[M]ust be filed with the court and set forth
specifically
the legal basis for the award, the nature
of the work performed by the attorney, the number of
hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the
time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for
which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the
reasonableness
of the fees for comparable legal
services. (emphasis added).
The self-serving statement that the fees are reasonable does not
"affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal
services" as required by Utah law.

(R. 755-56).

In addition,

this affidavit was timely objected to by Appellant so there
should have been an evidentiary hearing on the issue.

(See

Arguments I, A-C above).
To determine a reasonable amount for attorney fees the trial
court should have considered:
1.
2.
3.
4.

What legal work was actually performed?
How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary
to adequately prosecute the matter?
Is the attorney1 s billing rate consistent with the
rates customarily charged in the locality for similar
services?
Are there circumstances which require consideration of
additional factors, including those listed in the Code
of Professional Responsibility?

American Vending Services. Inc. v. Morse. 881 P.2d 917, 926 (Utah
App. 1994)(citing Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990,
(Utah 1988)(footnotes omitted).

The trial court failed to

support its order for attorney fees with evidence in the record
and failed "to show that it had undergone an analysis similar to
9

that contemplated by Dixie

State

Bank."

Id,

"The failure of the

trial court to enter adequate findings requires that the judgment
be vacated."

Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of County Comm' rs, 589

P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979).

Therefore, Mr. Mangrum' s affidavit was

insufficient, under Utah law, for an award of attorney's fees and
the trial court erred by awarding those fees without an
evidentiary hearing.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those stated in
Appellant's Appellate Brief, the decision of the trial court
should be reversed and the matter remanded for a determination of
the amount of fees which should be awarded to Mrs. Kramer on
appeal.

Alternatively, this matter should be remanded for an

evidentiary hearing, for entry of detailed findings of fact after
an independent and full inquiry by the trial court, and for an
appropriate revision of the judgment.
DATED this

&_ day of July, 1997.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS

//

M. JO?
Attorney for the Appellant
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